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II! THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE/ '. ' 1 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. y 
ELZA E. MILLER, 1 
Defendant/Appellant. ' i Case No. 890636-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter 
pursuant to U.C.A. 1953 §78-2A-3 (2) (c) (Replacement Volume 9, 1987 
Edition.), and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal follows a jury verdict in Washington County Fifth 
Circuit Court, Criminal Case No. 891000968, finding Appellant guilty 
of violating §1102(a), of the Uniform Plumbing Code as adopted by 
the City of St. George, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
At the close of the State's case, Appellant moved for a 
directed verdict, dismissing the Information. That motion was 
denied. 
Appellant testified and denied the allegations in the 
Information. 
-1-
Following presentation of the evidence the jury deliberated and 
returned a verdict of guilty. Appellant1s Motion for a Judgment of 
acquittal notwithstanding the verdict was denied and sentence was 
imposed on October 3, 198 9. This appeal follows. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the facts presented at trial were sufficient to 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant had violated 
§1102 (a) of the Utah Uniform Plumbing Code, as adopted by the City 
of St. George. 
2. Whether the Trial Court's refusal to allow Appellant to 
present evidence that there was no animosity between Appellant and 
the person during whose tenancy the sewer was clogged, in order to 
demonstrate lack of motive, denied Appellant his right to present a 
meaningful defense. 
3. Whether the Trial Judge should have been disqualified from 
sitting as a presiding judicial officer at the jury trial in this 
case where the Judge had, in prior matters, ruled against Appellant 
despite Appellant's testimony which directly contradicted the 
court's ultimate finding, the court was aware of Appellantfs 
criminal record arising out of disputes with persons living in his 
neighborhood and the Trial Judge, in his response to the Affidavit 
of Bias or Prejudice emphasized his perception of the leniency of 
the sentence in the prior matter, citing several aggravating aspects 
of that case. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution. 
r
:h^ Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Utah Code Annotated §77-35-29. 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding the Appellant 
guilty of depositing material in the public sewer which would or 
could cause damage to the public sewer, in violation cf §1102 (a) of 
the Uniform Plumbing Code as adopted by the City of St. George. 
This is a Class B Misdemeanor. The facts relevant to the issues 
presented for review are: 
On June 21, 1989, an Information was filed, charging Appellant 
with violating §1102(a) of the Uniform Plumbing Code as adopted by 
the City of St. George (Record at 1) . Appellant was served with a 
Summons in the matter' on June 25, 1989 (Record at 2). On July 12, 
1989, Appellant filed an Affidviat of Bias or Prejudice and 
requested that another Judge be appointed to hear the case (Record 
at 6) . In a written Order and Response, the Trial Judge referred 
the matter for review, pursuant to UCA §77-35-29(b) (Record at 9). 
The Judge to whom the matter was referred acknowledged having 
reviewed the Affidavit and Order/Response and determined that the 
Affidavit did not show sufficient grounds for disqualification 
(Record at 10). The matter proceeded to a jury trial, presided over 
by the Judge for whom disqualification was sought (Record at 58). 
At The jury trial the following facts were presented. 
In 1970, John B. Hopkins moved into a mobile home located at 
1932 foest 1700 North, St. George, Utah, (Transcript at 14) . He 
lived there until approximately one and one-half years prior tc 
trial. At that time he had moved into his new wife's home 
(Transcript at 15). 
When Mr. Hopkins moved into his mobile home in 1970 there was a 
public sewer near the property (Transcript at 17) . Appellant, who 
had acquired the lot just to the east of Mr. Hopkins (Transcript at 
15, 16) and Mr. Hopkins discussed connecting each one's property tc 
the city sewer by putting each one's line in the same trench 
(Transcript at 17 and 81), although there was contradicting 
testimony as to whether or not an agreement had been reached in that 
regard (See Transcript at 81 and 17). 
At the time the sewer was installed Appellant was not present 
(Transcript at 18) • Although Mr. Hopkins paid for the trench, he 
never discussed payment for the trench with the Appellant 
(Transcript at 18) but did request that Appellant reimburse him for 
pipe that was installed (Transcript at 112). 
The trench for the pipe was dug and pipe layed on Appellant's 
property for the sewer which serviced Mr. Hopkins' mobile home 
(Transcript at 19). The pipe is located just east of a block wall 
that separates Appellant's and Mr. Hopkins' property. (Transcript at 
19) . 
The. trench for the sewer line which was installed on 
Appellant's property was dug by the City of St. George and 
backfilled by employees of the City of St. George (Transcript at 
33). Mr. Hopkins did not observe the backfilling process 
(Transcript at 33). 
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After the sewer line was installed, Appellant put a mobile home 
on his lot (Transcript at 20) , but never did connect to the City 
Sewer System (Transcript at 111). 
Prior to Appellant's moving permanently onto his lot next to 
Mr, Hopkins1 property but after the sewer line had been installed, 
Mr, Hopkins caused a clean out to his sewer line to be added on 
Appellant's property so as to accommodate Mr. Hopkins1 brother and 
provide a place for Mr. Hopkins1 brother to dump sewage out of his 
mobile home (Transcript at 29-30) . The parties had no significant 
disputes until approximately a year and a half to two and a half 
years prior to trial when Mr. Hopkins remarried and indicated an 
intent to move off of the property and sell his mobile home and lot 
(Transcript at 83) . 
Although Appellant denies having made any threats to block Mr. 
Hopkins1 sewer should he move from the property (Transcript at 88) 
Mr. Hopkins testified that, shortly after his marriage, the 
Appellant stated to him "I am not going to let you sell that place. 
Just the minute you sell that place... I'll block the sewer." 
(Transcript at 22) and Mr. Hopkins1 current wife, Vedra Hopkins 
testified that shortly after their marriage she overheard Appellant 
tell Mr. Hopkins that he was going to "block your sewer if you ever, 
try to sell it [the property] to anybody." (Transcript at 135). 
Although Vedra Hopkins indicated that she did not hear any other 
threat by Appellant to block the sewer (Transcript at 138) Mr. 
Hopkins indicated that there were similar statements made by 
Appellant approximately five or six times (Transcript at 23) . The 
last of these statements was alleged to have been made on 
approximately May 15, 1989 (Transcript at 35) just before the then 
renter moved out of the property (Transcript at 3G) . No one else 
was present when the alleged statements were made (Transcript at 
22) . 
After their marriagef Mr* and Mrs. Hopkins caused a "for sale" 
sign to be placed on the property serviced by the sewer line that 
runs through Appellant's property (Transcript at 23). In the middle 
of April
 r 1989, an individual by the name of Ed moved into the 
Hopkins1 property and stayed there for approximately one month 
(Transcript at 26 and 35). Although "Ed" had an option to purchase 
the property, the option was not set out in any written agreement. 
Mr. Hopkins did not tell Appellant that Ed intended to buy the 
property (Transcript at 27) nor was there any other evidence 
presented at trial that Appellant ever became aware that Ed was a 
prospective purchaser of the property. 
Although the testimony was somewhat confusing with reference to 
when the sewer was blocked and when Ed moved off of the property, 
there was testimony presented at trial that the sewer was blocked 
just before Ed moved out (Transcript at 26) which would have been 
mid May, 1989 (Transcript at 35). 
Mr. Hopkins became aware of the sewer having been blocked when 
Ed told him that the sewer had backed up in the bathroom of Mr. 
Hopkins' mobile home located on the property (Transcript at 24-26). 
After receiving complaints with reference to the blockage, City 
employees went to Mr. Hopkins1 property, located the sewer line on 
Mr. Hopkins' property, exposed the sewer line approximately one to 
-6-
two feet to the west side of the wall which separated the 
properties, removed a piece of pipe approximately two feet long, 
allowed the sewage to drain out of the pipe, swabbed cut water and 
other material from the inside of the pipe and inserted a camera 
into the line from Mr. Hopkins1 property (Transcript at 39-40). The 
camera had its own light source and displayed, on a monitor, a black 
and white view of the inside of the sewer line (Transcript at 40 and 
54). No tape was kept of what was viewed on the monitor (Transcript 
at 42) , although the City had the equipment to keep a permanent 
record of what was observed (Transcript at 46) . There was a 
cleanout for the sewer line on Mr. Hopkins' property, located near 
his mobile home and the pipe ran in a straight line from that 
cleanout to where a 45° bend was noted on Appellant's property 
(Transcript at 42-45, 55) and that straight section of pipe slopes 
approximately 2% (Transcript at 56). 
About 14 to 16 feet in from the opening, in the direction of 
Appellant's property, just past a cleanout observed on Appellant's 
property (Transcript at 63) the operator of the camera observed what 
was identified by him as a rock in the sewer pipe (Transcript at 50) 
almost the same diameter as the inside of the pipe (Transcript at 
51). Although the cleanout was not apparent en Appellant's property 
by looking at the surface of his property (Transcript at 51) a 
cleanout on Appellant's property was apparent with the video camera 
(Transcript at 51-52) . The cleanout was located at or near the 45° 
bend in the pipe (Transcript at 52). No effort was made by the City 
personnel observing the pipe to remove the "rock" (Transcript at 
64). No scratches were observed on the inside of the pipe 
(Transcript at 71) . However, they would have been difficult to 
detect if they had been there (Transcript at 55). 
None of the witnesses who testified at trial observed the 
Appellant place anything in the sewer system. However, the 
Appellant denied placing a rock or any other item in the sewer line 
in order to plug it (Transcript at 89). 
Appellant testified and a video tape was shown to the ]ury 
displaying Appellant digging out the cleanout on his side of the 
property, removing the cap and examining the interior and exterior 
of the cleanout. The video taping was conducted approximately three 
weeks prior to trial (Transcript at 78). In order to remove the cap 
Appellant used a hammer and a wood chisel and testified at trial 
that the cap was set tight (Transcript at 97) . However, Appellant 
did acknowledge that the cap could set tight within a period of 
approximately six months (Transcript at 121). 
Approximately eight feet downgrade from the cleanout on 
Appellant's property a blockage was detected when Appellant placed a 
sewer cable in the line (Transcript at 99) . Appellant testified 
that there was a 45° bend in the pipe approximately two feet down 
grade from the cleanout on his property (Transcript at 99). 
Appellant also testified concerning his observations and photographs 
were presented to the jury indicating that there was a portion of 
the pipe approximately eight feet down grade from the cleanout that 
was collapsed (Transcript at 101). Appellant testified that this had 
been caused by large rocks on the pipe, which he had removed from 
the trench in order to expose the pipe, and by improper bedding and 
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compaction of the pipe (Transcript at 102). The City's witness 
acknowledged that rocks like those removed by Appellant when he 
exposed that section of the pipe, could cause the pipe to collapse 
as testified by Appellant (Transcript at 129) and acknowledged that 
a kink of that nature could cause the pipe to clog if paper and 
debris which would normally pass down an unclogged pipe could not 
get past (Transcript at 127) . A careful homeowner might never be 
'••• *:*&- _ 
aware of the crease and only become aware of the crease if something 
large enough were put in the pipe to block the opening (Transcript 
at 131) . 
Although there was a cleanout on Appellant's property, there 
was also a cleanout on Mr. Hopkins1 property (Transcript at 55-56). 
The cleanout on Mr. Hopkins' property was uncapped approximately one 
year prior to trial and, at the time of trial, was capped but had a 
rock, brick or block on top of the cap (Transcript at 107). 
At trial Appellant attempted to introduce evidence to 
demonstrate a lack of animosity between himself and "Ed", the 
alleged prospective purchaser during whose tenancy the sewer pipe 
became clogged. The court refused to allow Appellant to present 
evidence on that issue (Transcript at 86). 
During trial the court instructed the jury on the presumption 
of innocence, did not explain the term reasonable doubt, but did 
give the jury a "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction at 
Counsel's request (Transcript at 142). 
Following presentation of the City's case, Appellant moved foi: 
a directed verdict dismissing the matter (See transcript of 
sentencing at 2-3) . That motion was denied. After return of the 
jury's verdict, and just prior to sentencing, Appellant made a 
motion for a judgement notwithstanding the verdict. That motion was 
also denied (Transcript of sentencing at 3). 
This appeal followed. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this case Appellant claims, as error, failure of the Trial 
Court to disqualify himself or to have been disqualified pursuant to 
Appellant's Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice, that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict and that the Trial Court's 
exclusion of evidence concerning Appellant's relationship with the 
occupant of the home serviced by a sewer line Appellant is alleged 
to have clogged was error entitling Appellant to a new trial. 
Appellant, as a defendant in a criminal case, was entitled to 
present a defense, including evidence concerning motive or lack of 
motive to commit the crime. The Trial Court refused Appellant the 
opportunity to do so by refusing him the opportunity to present 
evidence concerning his friendly relationship with the occupant of 
the home serviced by the sewer line Appellant was alleged to have 
clogged. Especially in light of alleged threats made to the owner 
of that property, Appellant's friendly relationship with the actual 
occupant and alleged prospective purchaser of the property was 
certainly relevant in order to demonstrate lack of motive on the 
part of Appellant to commit the crime charged. The Trial Court's 
refusing to allow Appellant the opportunity to present that evidence 
denied Appellant an opportunity to present a meaningful defense in 
violation of Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution 
and the Sixth Amendement to the United States Constitution. 
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Although there was some circumstantial evidence presented at 
trial that supports the verdict of the jury, when viewed in light of 
the burden of proof required in a criminal case, that evidence was 
not sufficient, even if viewed in a light most favorable to the 
jury, to support the verdict. 
In this instance the Trial Court and the court reviewing the 
Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice abused their discretion in finding 
that the Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice was insufficient on its 
face, especially in light of the Trial Court's written response to 
the Affidavit, expressing his perception of Appellant and of its own 
leniency with regard to a previous case involving Appellant. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE JURY'S VERDICT, FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD 
DEPOSITED MATERIAL IN THE PUBLIC SEWER WHICH WOULD OR COULD CAUSE 
DAMAGE TO THE PUBLIC SEWER WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. 
In Harline vs. Campbell, 728 P.2d. 980 (Utah 1986) the Court 
reaffirmed prior rulings that the factual findings of a Trial Court 
will not be disturbed unless there is no substantial record in the 
evidence to support them. In that case, the Court indicated that, 
in order to obtain review of a factual finding of the Trial Court, 
the Appellant must marshall all evidence in support of the Trial 
Court's findings and then demonstrate that even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the factual determination made by the Trial 
Court, the evidence is insufficient to support its findings. A 
similar rule governs an appeal of a jury verdict. In In re; Estate 
of Bartell, P.2d. , 105 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1989) the 
Supreme Court stated: 
"When the appeal is from a jury's fact finding, we have 
said that the appellant has the obligation to marshall all 
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the evidence in support of those findings and, considering 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury, still 
demonstrate that the findings lack substantial evidentary 
support. 105 U.A.R. at 4. 
Even viewed in a light most favorable to the findings of the trier 
of fact, there is insufficient evidence, in fact a total lack of 
evidence, to support the conclusion that whatever was in the sewer 
system, whether deposited by Appellant or not, was "material which 
would or could cause damage to the public sewer." 
The only evidence presented at trial on the issue of whether 
the material would or could cause damage to the public sewer was 
that a rock like object was located in a sewer line servicing Mr. 
Hopkins' property, located on Appellant's property roughly in the 
vicinity of a crease which stopped the rock like object from passing 
through that individual line into the main. There was no evidence 
presented on a critical element of the offense, that is, whether 
that object would or could cause damage to the public sewer. For 
that reason alone the verdict of the jury should be set aside. 
However, even if there were sufficient evidence to support a finding 
by the jury that this rock like object would or could cause damage 
to the public sewer, there was insufficient evidence at trial to 
support the finding of the jury that Appellant deposited that 
material in the public sewer. 
At the trial of this matter, testimony was presented, although 
rebutted, that Appellant had made a threat that if his neighbor, Mr. 
Hopkins, sold his adjacent lot and home that Appellant would block 
the sewer. There was also testimony that the sewer was blocked by 
what appeared on a black and white monitor to be a rock. 
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Unfortunately, the jury was not able to view what was observed 
through the monitor because a video tape was not made. In light of 
the allegations of threat, the existence of a rock like obstruction 
in the sewer line and Appellant's access to the sewer line through 
the cleanout on his property, it is possible that Appellant could 
have placed something in the sewer system in order to block Mr. 
Hopkins1 sewer line. However, although there is some evidence to 
support the verdict, even when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the verdict the evidence is insufficient i.e. not substantial enough 
to support the verdict. 
The evidence presented, must be viewed in its totality in order 
to assess whether or not the evidence, even when viewed favorably to 
the verdict, supports the verdict. Disregarding Appellant's denial 
of wrong doing, the other relevant evidence that must be considered 
is: At the time the blockage occurred, the cleanout on Mr. Miller's 
property was not visible, apparently because it was underground, 
suggesting lack of access; there was access to the sewer line from 
the exterior of Mr. Hopkins1 home; and Mr. Hopkins was not on the 
premises at all times and so could not and did not testify whether 
or not someone else could have placed something in the sewer through 
the cleanout on his property which could slide down the sloped sewer 
line until it stopped at the crease located approximately six to 
eight feet from the cleanout on Mr. Miller's property. 
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, it 
is just as possible that the rock, or whatever it was, was placed in 
the pipe from Mr. Hopkins' property instead of from Mr, Millers. It 
is therefore just as likely as not that someone else placed the 
object in the pipe, resulting in its being clogged. 
•' - 1 3 - . • 
Pursuant to the burden of proof i.e. proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and in light of the availability of a reasonable alternative 
hypothesis, the evidence does not support the verdict and should be 
dismissed. 
B. APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE TRIAL 
COURT REFUSED TO ALLOW HIM TO PRESENT, CONSISTENT WITH THE THEORY OF 
HIS DEFENSE, EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THAT HE HAD NO ANIMOSITY TOWARD 
THE INDIVIDUAL RESIDING IN THE PROPERTY SERVICED BY THE SEWER PIPE 
ALLEGED TO HAVE BEE?! INTENTIONALLY CLOGGED FY APPELLANT. 
As a general rule, the Supreme Court has indicated that it will 
"not interfere with a trial court's ruling [excluding evidence] 
unless it clearly appears that the Court so abused its discretion 
that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted. State v. 
McCardell, 652 P.2d. 942 at 944 (Utah 1982). However, that 
statement must be viewed in light of Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and, by the stronger reasoning, the accused's 
right to present a defense as guaranteed under Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah State Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. In this instance, the Trial Court's refusing 
to allow Appellant to present evidence concerning his lack of 
animosity against the individual residing in the home serviced by 
the sewer line Appellant is alleged to have blocked denied the 
Appellant an opportunity to present relevant evidence of a defense 
and he is entitled to a new trial. 
In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) the United States 
Supreme Court stated: "the right to offer the testimony of 
witnesses,...is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the 
right to present the Defendant's version of the facts as well as 
the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth 
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lies." 388 U.S. at 19. The accused's "right to present a defense" 
must be considered in determining whether or not offered evidence 
should be admitted. 
In this instance, the trial court refused to allow Appellant 
the opportunity tc present evidence tending to show lack of motive 
to commit the crime alleged. That was a key element in the 
Defendant's presentation of his defense. Since there was evidence 
that the sewer was blocked and that Appellant, as well as other 
individuals, had potential access to the sewer line so that they 
could have blocked it and there was contradictory testimony by 
Appellant and the alleged victim concerning whether or not Appellant 
had made a threat to block the sewer and under what circumstances 
that alleged threat would be carried out, Appellant's relationship 
with the occupant of the mobile home serviced by the sewer line was 
relevant to the issue of whether Appellant had a motive to commit 
the crime. 
In State vs. Smith, 728 P.2d. 1014 (Utah 1986) a defendant who 
had been convicted of theft by deception and theft by receiving 
claimed that the trial court had erred in excluding his testimony 
which was intended to show that he had a strong motivation to avoid 
imprisonment and would not therefore have knowingly or intentionally 
committed the crimes charged. In analyzing the trial court's 
exclusion of that testimony, the Supreme Court stated: 
"A defendant's lack of a motive to commit the crime 
charged is...relevant evidence of innocence which he or 
she is entitled tc place before the jury.... Although a 
judge has discretion in ruling on relevancy, that 
discretion should be exercised with considerable 
liberality when the issue is motive because a wide 
latitude of evidence is relevant and hence admissible to 
prove motive." 728 P.2d. at 1016. 
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The court went on to state: "That the persuasiveness of the 
evidence may be weak or inconclusive goes to its weight, not its 
admissibility." 728 P.2d. at 1016. The court then cited an example 
in which the Supreme Court of Massachusetts had held that the 
testimony of a defendant's father that he told her he would give her 
money in reasonable amounts if she needed it, although perhaps not 
of great value in the defendant's murder/robbery trial, should have 
been permitted as tending to shov/ that the defendant had no motive 
for robbery, citing Commonwealth v. Ellison, 379 NE, 2d. 560 (Mass 
1978) . 
It is clear that the trial court should have allowed Appellant 
the opportunity to present the testimony offered. However, the 
inquiry does not end with a determination that the evidence should 
have been offered. If the court's refusal to permit the evidence is 
harmless error then Appellant would not be entitled to a reversal. 
That was the ultimate holding in the Smith case, in which the 
Supreme Court indicated that it will "reverse only if it appears 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error 
may have provided a different result," 728 P.2d. at 1016. 
In this case the admission of the evidence excluded by the 
trial court would have created a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
would have reached a different result. The evidence presented by 
the prosecution centered around Appellant's alleged animosity toward 
the owner of the property serviced by the sewer line and alleged 
threats by Appellant that if the property were sold, Appellant would 
block the sewer line. Even if those statements were made, a jury 
could reasonably conclude that if Appellant had friendly feelings 
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toward the prospective purchaser he would not have been inclined to 
clog the sewer. Appellant's relationship with Ed was certainly 
relevant in order to demonstrate whether or not Appellant had a 
motive to block the sewer line. The Trial Court's refusing to allow 
Appellant an opportunity to present that testimony denied him the 
right to present a meaningful defense and entitles Appellant to a 
reversal of his conviction and a new trial. 
C. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS CONVICTION REVERSED WHERE 
THE JUDGE PRESIDING AT THE JURY TRIAL CONTINUED TO ACT IN THE 
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE DESPITE THE TIMELY FILING OF AN 
AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS OR PREJUDICE ALLEGING THAT THE PRESIDING JUDGE HAD 
A BIAS AGAINST APPELLANT AS EVIDENCED BY HIS RULING AGAINST 
APPELLANT IN AT LEAST ONE OTHER CRIMINAL MATTER IN THE PAST, WHERE 
THE JUDGE, IN RESPONSE TO THOSE CLAIMS, WROTE THAT HE PERCEIVED HIS 
SENTENCE IN THAT CASE AS "LENIENT" IN LIGHT OF SPECIFICALLY 
ENUMERATED AGGRAVATING FACTORS, 
Appellant filed an Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice, seeking an 
alternate presiding judicial officer in this case, on or about July 
12, 1989. (Record at 6-8). Shortly thereafter the judge against 
whom the Affidavit was filed, Robert F. Owens, denied the Affidavit 
of Bias or Prejudice and certified the matter to Judge Dean E. 
Conder for ruling on the sufficiency of the Affidavit (Record at 
9-10). In the Order referring the matter to Judge Conder, Judge 
Owens pointed out that he and the prosecuting attorney were first 
cousins but that the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct would not mandate 
disqualification unless they were within the third degree of 
relationship, argued that recusal by himself in all cases involving 
this prosecutor would have a severe impact on the operation of the 
Court and denied a claim in the Affidavit that he and the prosecutor 
had professional contact during their practice of law in the Phoenix 
area. In addition, Judge Owens pointed out that he felt he had been 
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fair with the Appellant in a previous case and had imposed a 
relatively lenient fine, "in the context of a threat to use guns on 
neighbors in a long-standing neighborhood dispute, one which 
promises to be simmering for years to come, mutual restraining 
orders notwithstanding" (Record at 9). On or about the 19th day of 
July, 1989, Judge Conder issued an order finding that the Affidavit 
did not show sufficient grounds for disqualification and the motion 
for disqualification was ordered denied (Record at 10). The matter 
proceeded to a jury trial. 
The issue concerning this aspect of the case is whether Judge 
Owens should have been disqualified in light of the allegations in 
the Affidavit and his response. 
Appellant readily acknowledges that the record of the Trial 
Court's rulings during trial and the sentence imposed do not 
demonstrate bias as the basis for those rulings to the exclusion of 
other possibilities. For that reason a separate analysis of each of 
the Trial Court's rulings will not be undertaken. However, 
Appellant submits that the conviction should be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial with a non-disqualified Judge regardless of 
whether the Trial Court's rulings in this case specifically indicate 
bias or prejudice sufficient to alter the outcome of the trial to 
the exclusion of other reasons for those rulings where the Judge 
should have been disqualified in the first instance. 
The leading case that has been cited with reference to the 
issue of disqualification of a judge is Haslam v. Morrison, 190 
P.2d. 520 (Utah 1948). In Haslam the petitioner had filed an 
application for writ of mandate directing respondent Judge Morrison 
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to grant petitioner's motion that another district judge, not 
disqualified, be called in to try the case. Petitioner had filed an 
action for false imprisonment in Judge's Morrison's court and had 
filed an affidavit in that case stating that he believed that he 
could not obtain a fair and impartial trial before Judge Morrison 
because the judge was biased and prejudiced against him. The 
grounds for the conclusion were that the judge in a prior trial had 
made arbitratory rulings against petitioner, had rudely interrupted 
and stepped petitioner while he was testifying, which tended to get 
petitioner confused and upset, and at the conclusion of that prior 
trial Judge Morrison had deliberately announced and stated in open 
court that he didn't believe petitioner and rendered judgment 
against petitioner in the case. The affidavit further alleged that 
petitioner's wife, who was also a witness in that case, felt that 
Judge Morrison's rulings and interruptions showed that he was biased 
and prejudiced against petitioner and accused them of giving false 
and perjured testimony and that she, although an indispensable 
witness, refused to come and testify at trial if Judge Morrison were 
the presiding judge. The petitioner in that matter alleged that 
Judge Morrison had ignored the affidavit of bias or prejudice and 
that therefore the motion was filed that another district judge, not 
disqualified, be called in to to try the case. That motion was 
denied and the application for writ of mandate was filed. 
In Haslam the majority of the court defined bias and prejudice 
as "hostile feeling or spirit of ill will toward one of the 
litigants or undue friendship or favoritism toward one" (190 P. 2d. 
at 523). The court pointed out that although "the mere filing of an 
affidavit of bias or prejudice does not ipso facto disqualify a 
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judge", (190 P.2d. 523) the general practice in that jurisdiction of 
judges disqualifying themselves whenever an affidavit of bias or 
prejudice against them had been filed was a commendable practice 
because: 
"The purity and integrity of the judicial process 
ought to be protected against any taint of suspicion to 
the end that the public and litigants may have the highest 
confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts." 
(190 P.2d. at 523-524) 
and that 
"It is ordinarily better for a judge to disqualify himself 
even though he may be entirely free of bias and prejudice 
if either litigant files an affidavit of bias and 
prejudice. 'Next in importance to the duty of rendering a 
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as 
will beget no suspicion of the fairness or integrity of 
the judge' (190 P.2d. at 523-524). 
Although the practice of that district was approved, the 
Supreme Court did acknowledge that, although actual bias and 
prejudice on the part of the trial judge for or against any litigant 
will disqualify him, "the existence of bias and prejudice is a 
question addressed to the sound discretion of the judge against whom 
the affidavit is filed." 190 P.2d. at 523. 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and UCA 
§77-35-29 clearly supersede at least part of the ruling in the 
Kaslam case by directing that another judge pass on the sufficiency 
of the affidavit alleging bias or prejudice. However, -the Haslam 
decision has been cited with approval on several occasions not so 
much for its ultimate holding but for its analysis and specifically 
for Justice Wade's concurring opinion. Justice Wade suggested 
several reasons for a judge, against whom an affidavit of bias or 
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prejudice is filed, to disqualify himself. Those include: (1) if an 
affidavit of bias or prejudice is filed there is no good reason for 
the court not to disqualify himself. Justice Wade stated: 
"If the judge is not biased and prejudiced, there does not 
seem to be any good reason why, if a litigant in this 
court believes he is, that he should not get another judge 
to try the case since the result of the litigation should 
be the same in both cases. In this state, a change of 
judge in a particular case can be readily arranged without 
inconvenience either to the court or the litigants." 190 
P.2d. at 526; 
(2) By stepping aside a judge against whom an affidavit of prejudice 
is filed lessens the likelihood that his remaining on the case will 
be perceived as an effort to "vent his spleen on the litigant 
against whom he is prejudiced". 190 P. 2d. at 526. Justice Wade 
stated: 
"Even though the judge is entirely free from bias and 
prejudice where he refuses to make the change the party 
making the application therefore will very likely always 
believe that in making such ruling he had ulterior 
motives." 190 P.2d. at 526; 
and, (3) Even if there is no actual bias, if there is a suggestion 
of bias or prejudice, by stepping aside, the appearance of the 
impartiality of the court system is preserved. Justice Wade stated: 
"One of the most important things in government is that 
all persons subject to its jurisdiction shall always be 
able to obtain a fair and impartial trial in all matters 
of litigation in its courts. It is nearly as important 
that the people have absolute confidence in the integrity 
of the courts. I can think of nothing that would as 
surely bring the courts into disrepute as for a judge to 
insist on trying a case where one of the litigants 
believes that such judge is biased and prejudiced against 
him. This is especially true where the judge in a 
previous case has made remarks which indicated that he 
questioned the veracity or integrity of such litigant. I 
therefore believe that in such a case it would be very 
desirable for the judge to disqualify himself whether he 
was in fact biased and prejudiced against such party or 
not." 190 P.2d. at 526. 
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In Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d. 199 (Utah App. 1987) Justice 
Davidson quoted from the majority opinion in Haslam and Justice 
Wade's concurrence when he wrote: 
"We offer the general philosophy expressed in Haslam v. 
Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d. 520, 523 (1948), noting 
that an affidavit of bias and prejudice is treated 
differently today than it was in 1948... 743 P.2d. at 
207-208. 
Although Haslam has been cited in cases regarding efforts to 
have a Judge disqualified, the case appears to have been cited 
primarily for its statement of general philosophy. State v. Neeley, 
748 P.2d. 1091 (Utah 1988), however, is one of the few cases since 
Haslam in which the court provided some guidance instead of general 
philosophy regarding disqualification. 
In Neeley, the Court reaffirmed its earlier stand that "the 
integrity of the judicial system should be protected against any 
taint of suspicion" and recommended that "a judge recuse himself 
where there is a colorable claim of bias or prejudice." 748 P.2d. 
at 1094. The Court also indicated that "a judge should recuse 
himself when his 'impartiality' might reasonably be questioned" and 
that that practice "may require recusal in instances where no actual 
bias is shown." 748 P.2d. at 10 84. The Court suggested that a 
"trial judge disqualify himself whenever an affidavit of bias and 
prejudice is filed against him in good faith" but went on to 
acknowledge that "this practice is not mandatory". Citing State v. 
Byington, 200 P.2d. 723 (Utah 1948). 748 P.2d. at 1094. The 
ultimate conclusion of the Supreme Court in the Neeley case on this 
issue, appears to be that, although the better practice would be for 
the judge to disqualify himself, "absent a showing of actual bias or 
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an abuse of discretion, failure [of the judge to disqualify himself] 
did not constitute reversible error as long as the requirements of 
§77-35-29 are met." 748 P.2d. at 1094-1095. 
In light of the Neeley ruling, then, the issue in this case is 
whether the requirements of §77-35-29 were met or was there an abuse 
of discretion. Appellant respectfully maintains that, although 
technically the procedural steps suggested in §77-35-29 were 
followed, based on the abuse of discretion standard this case should 
be reversed. 
UCA §77-35-29(d) provides: 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency of 
the allegation of disqualification, he shall enter an 
order directing that a copy be forthwith certified to 
another named judge of the same court or of a court of 
like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the 
legal sufficiency of the allegations. If the challenged 
judge does not question the legal sufficiency of the 
affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is 
certified finds that it is legally sufficient, another 
judge shall be called to try the case or to conduct the 
proceeding. If the judge to whom the affidavit is 
certified does not find the affidavit to be legally 
sufficient, he shall enter a finding to that effect and 
the challenged judge shall proceed with the case or 
proceeding. 
There is no claim by Appellant that the Trial Judge did not 
technically comply with the procedural requirements of §77-35-29. 
However, Appellant maintains that the Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice 
is sufficient on its face and that, even if not, the Trial Judge's 
written response demonstrates sufficient bias or prejudice that, in 
light of the policy previously cited, a non-disqualified judge 
should have presided at the trial. 
Current rules governing disqualification of a judge with 
respect to a specific case are found in Utah Code Annotated 
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§77-35-29, previously mentioned, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah 
Code Annotated §78-7-1. These Rules and Statutes establish certain 
conditions that mandate disqualification. However, even though 
there are now specific instances where disqualification must occur 
and there is now a process whereby another judge is called in to 
pass on the motion to disqualify, the Haslam court's reliance on the 
"sound discretion" of the trial judge suggests that discretion, or 
abuse of that discretion in ruling on the affidavit, is still a 
necessary consideration even if the specific factors that mandate 
disqualification are not alleged. 
Appellant maintains that the matter of disqualification was one 
submitted to the discretion of the court, that the Trial Court 
abused its discretion by refusing to disqualify himself and that the 
reviewing Judge abused his discretion by upholding that decision in 
light of the Trial Judgefs written remarks in response to the 
Affidavit. 
The Trial Court's relationship to the prosecutor, falling 
within the forth degree of relationship, would not normally mandate 
disqualification. On the face of the Affidavit and the Trial 
Court's Response there does not appear to be anything about that 
relationship to suggest that it is a close enough personal 
relationship so as to create an actual bias or prejudice in favor of 
the prosecutor. However, that allegation, when coupled with the 
Appellant's concern regarding the Judge's previous rulings in the 
case and, by the stronger reasoning, the Court's response to that 
claim, does create an appearance of impartiality. 
-24-
In his response to the allegations in the Affidavit, the Court 
stated that he had imposed a "relatively lenient fine of $100.00, in 
the context of a threat to use guns on neighbors in a long-standing 
neighborhood dispute, one which promises to be simmering for years 
to come, mutual restraining order notwithstanding" (Record at 9) . 
This suggests that the Judge does harbor some concern with 
reference to Appellant, Appellant!s interation with his neighbors 
and the Judge's own previously imposed lenient sentence. The Judge 
was concerned enough about his own perceived leniency in the 
previous proceeding to bring that to light and cite factors he 
obviously considered aggravating. His concern, expressed pre-trial, 
creates the appearance of impartiality. A totally neutral presiding 
judicial officer would not have had those same views or expressed 
those same concerns. 
Whether or not the Trial Judge was actually biased or 
prejudiced at trial can not be clearly demonstrated from the record. 
The Court's rulings with reference to evidentary matters and jury 
instructions could be based on considerations other than prejudice 
against Appellant. However, Appellant respectfully submits that the 
Trial Court's refusal to disqualify himself in the face of the 
appearance of impartiality constituted an abuse of discretion by 
both the Judge for whom disqualification was sought and the Judge 
who reviewed the Affidavit and that the case should be remanded with 
instructions, that, consistent with the Affidavit of Bias or 




In this case Appellant is entitled to a reversal of his 
conviction and an order of acquittal for the reason that the 
evidence presented was not sufficient to establish an essential 
element of the offense: that the material, even if deposited by 
Appellant, would or could cause damage to the public sewer, nor was 
the evidence sufficient to prove that, whatever the material would 
or could do, Appellant had deposited it. However, in the event the 
Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
verdict, Appellant is entitled to a new trial, having been denied an 
opportunity to present a meaningful defense. He was not allowed to 
demonstrate to the jury his friendly relationship to the actual 
occupant of the property serviced by the plugged sewer line and, 
therefore, his lack of motive to commit the act alleged. Finally, 
this case should be remanded for a new trial before a Judge not 
disqualified, by reason of the Trial Courtfs and reviewing Judge's 
abuse of discretion in failing to disqualify the Trial Judge 
pursuant to the Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice, especially in light 
of the Trial Judge's written comments concerning Appellant and the 
Judge's perception of its own previous leniency. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the guilty verdict and enter an order of cicquittal or, in 
the alternative, that the Court remand this case for a new trial 
before a judge who is not disqualified and that the Court direct 
that Appellant be allowed an opportunity to present testimony 
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concerning his relationship with the occupant of the property 
serviced by the sewer line Appellant is alleged to have clogged. 
DATED this day of February, 1990. 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of 
the Appellate Brief, postage pre-paid on this 2>*/tl- day of 
February, 1990, to the following: 
Theodore W. Shumway 
St. George City Attorney 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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ADDENDUM 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution* 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county of district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases* ... 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crimes shall have been committed which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence". 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant 
evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States, or by these 
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
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CIRCUIT COURT 
St George Dept 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
G. Michael Westfall #3434 
Attorney for Defendant 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
P. 0. Box 367 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS 
Plaintiff, ) OR PREJUDICE AND 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
VS. ) 
ELZA E. MILLER, ) Case No. 891000968 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
Pursuant to Rule 63(b), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Elza E. Miller, Defendant above-named, upon first being duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the Defendant in the above-entitled matter. 
2. On or about June 22, 1989, a summons was issued in the 
above-entitled Court, requiring that I appear in Court to answer the 
charge that I had violated §1102(a) of the Uniform Plumbing Code as 
adopted. 
3. I am informed and believe that the Honorable Robert F. 
Owens is a first cousin to Theodore W. Shumway, the St. George City 
M2/8 
6 
prosecuting attorney. In addition I am informed and believe that 
Judge Owens and Mr. Shumway each practiced law in Phoenix, Arizona 
and that they were acquainted before they both moved to St. George, 
Utah. In addition, Judge Owens has ruled against myself and my wife 
in criminal cases in the past despite our testimony that we had not 
violated the law. 
Judge Owens should therefore not be the presiding judicial 
"TO 
officer in this case because 1) he is personally related ' and 
acquainted with the prosecuting attorney in an other than purely 
professional capacity, 2) Judge Owens, having already made decisions 
against me in the past which can only mean that he did not believe 
me in those instances, could not be expected to render a decision in 
my favor in this instance if my credibility is called into question 
and, 3) Judge Owens is aware of prior convictions of myself and my 
wife for criminal convictions which would otherwise not be 
admissible in Court for the purpose of impeachment. 
DATED this /^L day of July, 1989. 
Elz-a E. Miller 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
On the )d day of July 1989, personally appeared before me 
Elza E. Miller, the signer of the foregoing document, who upon being 
duly sworn, acknowledged to me that he executed the;same. 
/ % / \ ~ , \ 
My Commission Expires'£i=»-» —-Residing In: 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
I hereby certify that this Affidavit is asserted by my client 
in good faith and not for any improper purpose. 
DATED this f/- day of July, 19 89. 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
By: 
G"." Michi'el 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hano^QQirWer^d a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document on the "S^ br day of July, 1989, to 
the following: \£*^ 
Theodore W. Shumway 
St. George City Attorney 
175 E. 200 N. 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Secretary 
_ j - S 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
ECZ& E. MILLER, 
Defendant 
The Defendant filed an Affidavit of Bias and Prejudice on 
July 12, 1989. This is the second such filing by this Defendant 
on essentially the same allegations, the first having been denied. 
IT IS ORDERED certifying this case to Judge Dean E. Conder for 
a ruling on the sufficiency, along with the following comments. 
1. The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct sets the standard for 
disqualification at the 3rd degree of relationship (Canon 3,C,1,D). 
Ted Shurmvay, as a first cousin, is at the 4th degree. 
2. Since Ted Shumway is St. George City Attorney, recusal by 
myself in all city cases would have a severe inpact on the operation 
of the court, because they constitute half the workload. 
3. Although we each practiced law in the Phoenix area for 
several years (Ted in Scottsdale and I in North Phoenix), I recall 
no professional contact. Phoenix had about 30 superior courts and 
a thousand lawyers in that period. 
4. Ruling against someone in a previous hearing is not, in 
itself, evidence of bias. I have reviewed the transcript of the 
previous case, City of St. George v. Eliza E. Miller, No. 891000348 
(now on appeal), and it indicates at least as many interim rulings 
for the defendant as against him, as well as a relatively lenient 
• fine of $100, in the context of a threat to use guns on neighbors in 
a long-standing neighborhood dispute, one which promises to be 
simnering for years to come, mutual restraining orders notwithstanding. 
O R D E R 
Case No. 8910001368 
Ci 
July 18, 1989 
Robert F. Ovens 
Circuit Judge 
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER was sentv"-v>>— 
postage prepaid, on this 18th day of July, 1989, to the following 
interested parties: 
G. Michael Westfall 
One South Main Street 
Dixie State Bank Building 
P.O. Box 367 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Theodore W. Shumway 
St. George City Attorney 
175 E. 200 N. 
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELZA E. MILLER 
1926 West 1700 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 891000968 
The above matter having come on for trial before a jury on 
Defendant Elza E. Miller's plea of not guilty to charges of 
violating Sec. 1102(a), Uniform plumbing Code as adopted by St. 
George, the Defendant being present and represented by counsel, 
and the jury having heard the evidence presented by the parties 
and rendered a verdict that the Defendant was guilty as charged, 
Based upon the verdict of the jury and good cause appearing 
therefor, Defendant Elza E. Miller is found and adjudged to be 
guilty of the charge against him. The Defendant appeared for 
sentencing on October 3, 1989, and a fine of $750*00 is imposed, 
$500.00 of which is suspended for a period of one year on 
conditions (1) that Defendant conduct himself as a law-abiding 
citizen; (2) that he either remove or cause to be removed any 
stones or foreign objects in the undergound line connecting 
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improvements on the property of John Hopkins and the City sewer 
main where it traverses the Defendant's property, repairing any 
openings made therein in order to do so, and having the 
unobstructed, repaired line inspected by a St. George City 
building inspector- before again covering with soil; (3) that 
Defendant remove the clean-out valve on the John Hopkins line 
which is located on the Defendant' s property as a part of the 
repairs to be effected and inspected by the City of St. George; 
and (4) that Defendant use every reasonable discretion to avoid 
confrontations or loud and overt actions calculated to draw 
attention to the Defendant during those periods when John Hopkins 
is showing his property to a prospective buyer. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this 3rt day of t)cLoirer, 1989. 
Robert F. Owens r 
Circuit Court Judge,.. 
